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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2A-3(2)(k)(Supp. 1995). The district court's Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance
were final.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1
No tender of Payment was required because:
(A) Mr. Harris failed to cooperate in following the formula for setting the contract price
and announced that he would not accept a sum less than what he insisted upon, regardless
of any contract price.
(B) The property to be sold was encumbered with liens and a set price was
indeterminable.
(C) Mr. Harris refused to recognize legitimate offsets owing to Mr. Shields that reduced
the contract price.

The trial Court acted properly and was correct in:
(A) Harmonizing the terms of the option to buy the contract and the corresponding lease
agreement.
(B) This issue is not the subject of review on appeal because it was never raised at trial.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The appellee, Mr. Joseph Shields, had no duty to tender payment of the purchase price
because appellant, Mr. Harris specifically announced that he would not accept the amount of the
contract price. Further, the real property to be sold was encumbered with liens and the buyer, Mr.
Shields, had legitimate offsets to the purchase price. Therefore the purchase price could not be
determined and any tender was pointless.
When viewed in light of the clearly interrelated written agreements, the Option To Buy
agreement executed by the seller, Mr. Harris, is consistent and harmonious with the lease
agreement. Further, should the court find any inconsistencies between the agreements, they must
be construed against the interest of the party who drafted them, and that is the seller, Mr. Harris.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

NO TENDER OF PAYMENT WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE:
(A) MR. HARRIS FAILED TO COOPERATE IN FOLLOWING THE
FORMULA FOR SETTING THE CONTRACT PRICE AND ANNOUNCED
THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A SUM LESS THAN WHAT HE
INSISTED UPON, REGARDLESS OF ANY CONTRACT PRICE;
(B) THE PROPERTY TO BE SOLD WAS ENCUMBERED WITH
LIENS AND A SET PRICE WAS INDETERMINABLE; AND,
(C) MR. HARRIS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE LEGITIMATE
OFFSETS OWING TO MR. SHIELDS THAT REDUCED THE CONTRACT
PRICE.

(A) MR. HARRIS FAILED TO COOPERATE IN FOLLOWING THE FORMULA FOR
SETTING THE CONTRACT PRICE AND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT
A SUM LESS THAN WHAT HE INSISTED UPON, REGARDLESS OF ANY CONTRACT
PRICE;
The Appellant's Point I argument regarding the requirement for tender of payment fails
because in this case it is plain and clear that tender of the purchase price for the subject property
required the cooperation of Mr. Harris, (the appellant/seller) and Mr. Harris refused to give that
cooperation. A simple reading of the "Option To Buy" contract clause relative to the purchase
price makes it obvious that such cooperation is necessary:
A. Lessee, Joseph W. Shields would have this Special option to buy said ranch from
Lessor Arvil A. Harris for a reasonable price to be negotiated by five independent people,
one man from the Federal land Bank, one manfromthe Soil Conservation Service in
Roosevelt, Utah office, one bankerfromthe First Security Bank of Utah loan department,
Roosevelt Utah, one farmer in the Myton, Utah area, and one real estate broker in the
Myton or Roosevelt area. Thesefivepeople would make a fair study at the time of
purchase to make an honest and fair appraisal of the ranch. All five bids would be added
up for a grand total and divided byfiveto arrive at a selling price.
(See Appellant's Add. Doc. 1). Under this formula for determining the purchase price of
3

the subject property, it is impossible to tender an exact payment of cash. There obviously must
first be cooperation by the parties in selecting the required five appraisers. Those appraisers must
then "make a fair study" of the property and do their due diligence to arrive at their independent
appraised value. Only then can the five appraisals be added and divided to obtain the sale price
amount.
The trial court recognized the need for such cooperation when it stated in its' Findings of
Fact as follows:
Shields was not required to tender the purchase price under the facts and circumstances of
this case because the formula for finalizing the purchase price could not be completed
without the cooperation of both parties as specifically set forth in the Option To Buy
agreement. Since both parties are held to the standard of merchants, good faith and fair
dealing is implied in their transactions.

(See Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law at Appellant's Add. Doc. 4 at 4, f 17).
Mr. Harris, the seller of the land, refused to so cooperate and expressly stated his intent
that he would not follow the formula in the Option To Buy agreement. Prior to any legal action
having been taken by Mr. Shields (the appellee/buyer), Mr. Harris wrote two letters stating that
he would accept nothing less than the price of $265,000. Those two letters, dated November 5th
1993 and November 12th, 1993, were marked as exhibit #40 and exhibit #41 and received as
evidence at trial. (Appellee's Add. Docs. 1 & 2). Relevant portions of exhibit #40 and #41 are
quoted here as follows;
"No Judge in the State of Utah would ever make me sell My ranch for less than $265,000.
that's My Price to you, take it or leave it."
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"And No Way in Hell will the Judge make me sell the Ranch for less than the
$275,000.00 I told you + I have told Joe - He can have it for $265,000. take it or leave it.
I'm - firm in what I want. ($265,000.00 + Not a penny less)."
While being cross examined on the witness stand, Mr. Harris was asked regarding his
willingness to accept tender of payment for anything less than $265,000. The dialogue went as
follows:
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) Mr. Harris, let me ask this question: If Joe Shields had brought you
money for $190,000, He brought you $190,000 and tendered payment to you one year
ago, would you have accepted it?
A. No, I would not.
Q. And did you communicate that to Mr. Shields?
A. Yes, I did, if there was any communication done. But I would not accept the 190,000.
I assume that's the hypothetical figure you put in.
Q. That is a hypothetical figure that I have drawn. Would you have accepted 220,000?
A. No
Q. Would you have accepted a penny less than $265?
A. No. I was holding out for $300,000.
Q. And did you communicate that to me as well?
A. I think I did.
(Tr. at pp. 262 -3).
Mr. Harris is refusing to follow the formula of the very Option To Buy agreement that he
prepared, executed, and delivered to Mr. Shields. It was Mr. Shields who cooperated by
following the formula of the agreement in requesting four of the five appraisers to appraise the

subject property. The fifth appraiser, the Soil Conservation Service, would not engage in such an
undertaking. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant's Add. Doc. 4 at 5, <U 1118
& 19). The average of the submitted appraisals was approximately one hundred thousand
($100,000) dollars less than the $265,000 that Mr. Harris was insisting upon. Mr. Harris is
appealing on the issue of failure to tender payment when he, Mr. Harris, made it plain and clear
that any tender of payment which followed the formula of the Option To Buy agreement would
be an "idle ceremony" and a "fruitless gesture."
The Utah Court Of Appeals has recently held that tender will be excused where "it is
plain and clear that a tender, if made, would be an idle ceremony and of no avail/" Jenkins v.
Equipment Center. Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah App. 1994) citing Fitzgerald_YJCorbett, 793
P,2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990) (quoting 74 Am.Jur.2d lender § 4 (1974)); accord Hansen v.
Chri&ten&en, 545 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1976)(tender excused where obligee's unreasonable
conduct "would make an actual tender a fruitless gesture").
The law of the Jenkins case respecting tender addresses the same factual situation in the
present case and is controlling of the present issue:
Generally, a tender must be made of the amount actually due. See Simons v. Bushears
Transfer and Storage, 344 P.2d 1107, 112 (Okla. 1959). ^But if the demand of a larger
sum is so made that it amounts to an announcement that it is useless to tender a smaller
sum, it dispenses with any tender and amounts to a waiver of the lien/
Id
In the present case, Mr. Harris demanded a sale price far in excess of the contract formula
price and expressly announced that he would not accept "a penny less." Mr. Harris, by written
6

correspondence and by verbal announcement made it clear that it would be useless to tender any
smaller sum. Mr. Shields should not now, as a matter of law, be found at fault for not making a
tender. The Appellate Court in Jenkins impliedly adopts the position of other jurisdictions by
quoting that ff[o]ther states have found tender to be fruitless and thus excused where the lienor
states that he or she does not intend to accept payment." Id. (citations omitted).
Appellant cites Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) to support
the opposing argument that tender must be made. But the Carr case explicitly recognizes the very
exception that is applicable to the present case:
[t]he familiar rule that the law does not require one to do a vain or useless thing excuses
the making of,a formal tender which would otherwise be required, where it is reasonably
plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle ceremony and of no avail, as
where it appears that a tender, if made, will be refused for some reason unrelated to the
tender or its sufficiency....
Id, at 1295 (Emphasis added). The law does not require Shields to make a tender where Harris
has made it clear that anything less than the arbitrary demand by Harris will be refused.
Appellant fails to address the relevant facts that invoke application of the exception to the tender
rule as spelled out in Carr.
Shields took the necessary steps that were required to satisfy any tender requirements.
He got the appraisals as set forth by the formula in the Option to Buy. (Tr. at 108).
He applied for and was approved for a loan from the Federal Land Bank. (Tr. at 109). Evidence
of his approved loan is clear by the fact that he actually closed a related loan through Sunrise
Title Company in the sum of $445,000.00. (Tr. at 25 line 10). He obtained a title report and was
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ready to close the deal with Mr. Harris at Sunrise Title Company. (Appellee's Add. Doc. 3). He
communicated that he was ready, willing and able to perform in connection with the Option
contract. Exhibit 38 (Appellee's Add. Doc. 4).
The response by Harris towards these efforts by Shields was communicated in the
November 5th and November 12th, 1993 letters referred to previously in this brief. (Appellee's
Add. Docs. 1 & 2). The substance of that response was that regardless of the contract formula,
"no way in hell" would the property be sold for less than $265,000.
There is substantial case law outside the state of Utah that supports the exception to
requiring offers of tender. The Supreme Court of Washington held that: "[i]t is, of course, true
that where a seller announces in advance that he will not complete the transaction the purchaser
is excused from making a tender of the money. No one is required to do a vain thing." Ellingsen
v^iandre, 241 P.2d 207, 209 (1952), (citations omitted). The Colorado Supreme Court upheld
the finding that: " ...the tender was obviated by the absolute and unqualified refusal of defendant
to perform. Tender is not required where it would be an idle or useless thing." Gerbaz_v»_Hulsey,
288 P.2d 357, 360 (1955). The Arizona Supreme Court has ruled similarly:
It is clear from the evidence that defendant did not intend to recognize the contract as one
for the purchase of the property and the court was fully justified in concluding that any
kind of tender which would require the conveyance of the property would be an empty
gesture and useless. No tender of performance is necessary under such conditions. It is
sufficient if plaintiff is ready, willing and offers to perform.
Lee^Nichols, 301 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1956).
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The unwillingness by Harris to cooperate in following the formula for determining the
contract price destines the failure of his case. The Utah Supreme Court in Ferris v. Jennings,
595 P.2d 857 (1979), stated as follows:
But to be considered therewith the parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good
faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its expressed intent. A
contract is not fatally defective as to price if there is an agreement as to some formula or
method for fixing it. Quite beyond this, one party to a contract cannot by wilful act or
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to perform and then invoke the
other'sjion-performance £&_a_defens£.
Id., at 859 (Emphasis added).
The expressed intent of the Option To Buy contract in the present case is that the average
of five appraisals will determine the sale price. Harris was legally obligated to follow the
expressed intent of his own contract, but he adamantly refused to do so. Harris can not now claim
as a defense to his refusal to abide by the terms of the contract that Shields did not tender what
Harris refused to accept.
The parties to a contract are required to act in good faith and are bound to cooperate to
carry out their original intent. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
When parties have entered into a formal contract, such as for the purchase of real
property, it is to be assumed that they will cooperate with each other in good faith for its
performance, and one refusing to so perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, has the
burden of showing justification for doing so.
Tanner^Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980).
Harris had an obligation to act in good faith in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Harris was prohibited from making it difficult or impossible for Shields to perform pursuant to
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the contract terms and then use this as a defense to Shields' action to enforce the contract. Harris
failed to act in good faith. He made it useless and burdensome and perhaps even impossible for
Shields to perform tender. As the Court in Tanner stated:
We have no doubt as to the correctness of Defendant's assertion that in order to warrant
specific performance, the essential terms of the contract must be sufficiently definite to
enable the parties to understand what their obligations are. But the proper application of
that rule is as a shield to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon with which to work
an injustice.
Id., at 347.
In the case at hand the trial court found that the "[t]erms of the option agreement were
definite and enforceable and are construed against Harris who drafted the document." (Findings
of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4, % 13; Appellant's Add., Doc. 4.) Harris now seeks to use his
own bad faith as a weapon against his purchaser. Shields should be protected and allowed the
exception from tendering any offer and the trial court's ruling should be upheld.

(B)
THE PROPERTY TO BE SOLD WAS ENCUMBERED WITH LIENS AND A SET
PRICE WAS INDETERMINABLE;
The argument of Appellant respecting tender should fail for another very important
reason which Appellant fails to even raise in their brief. Prior to and during trial, the title to the
subject real property was encumbered with liens. Mr. Morgan Glines, a professional state
certified abstractor for twenty years and a licensed title examiner for Sunrise Title Company in
Roosevelt, Utah, was the first witness called at trial. (Tr. at 8). Through Mr. Glines, a
documented "Commitment For Title Insurance" was issued to Mr. Shields and that document
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was received into evidence at trial. (Appellee's Add., Doc. 3). Based on the afore-stated
document and his work regarding the legal status of the title to the subject property, Mr. Glines
testified repeatedly that liens and encumbrances existed on the subject property. The relevant
portion of Mr. Glines testimony concerning the liens and encumbrances begins on page 12, line
15 of the Trial transcript and runs through page 18, line 8. Mr. Glines testimony refers to seven
(7) different liens and his testimony is condensed here as follows:
Lien#l page 12 line 15:
A. (By Mr. Glines) Item Number 12 appears as a result of a break in the
chain of title from rental failure.
Lien #2 page 13 line 13:
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) Now, what is the next encumbrance that you see
from your title report?
A. Eastern easement. I would move down to item 14, which shows a
mortgage by James and Carol Rice to Farm Home.
Q. Does your title report reflect the amount?
A. $32,100.
Q. Is there anything of public record to show that mortgage has been paid
or resolved?
A. No.
Q. Is it true then, that before you could insure this title that mortgage
would have to be removed?
A. Yes.
Lien #3 page 13 line 25:
Q. What is the next encumbrance that you have?
A. Item Number 15.
Q. Which is?
A. Unrecorded real estate contract between Arvil Harris and Rich Tran.
page 14 line 9 Q. What would it take to clear that encumbrance from the title, do you
know?
A. Documentation from Frontier Investments to indicate they do not claim
any interest in the title.
11

Lien #4 page 14 line 16
Q. Is there another encumbrance in your report?
A. Item number 16.
Q. What is that?
A. Another unrecorded real estate contract between Virginia Felter and
Marion Felter and Elizabeth Felter where they sold on contract to Rich
Tran again,
page 15 line 6
Q. Do you know whether or not Frontier Investments is willing to just give
that kind of documentation to clear this lien?
A. No.
Q. Is it possible that they might just give a release?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it possible that you might need to bring a quiet title action to remove
their interest or define their interest?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what it would take to remove those — that lien?
A. No.
Q. Isn't it true that it would depend on a number of factors —
A. Yes.
Lien #5 and Lien #6 page 15 line 25
Q. Are there other liens?
A. Yes. Item number 17. It's what we refer to as a long-term lien
agreement with the department of Agriculture, the ASCS office where
funds have been made available to Arvil Harris for some type of irrigation
type system.
Q. Is that the same as item number 18, another agriculture stabilization
conservation service loan?
A. It's the same type of thing. But it indicates that it is a different loan. It
was recorded at different times. So it would indicate that there are two
loans that's been granted by the ASCS office.
Q. And do those two loans currently constitute an encumbrance on the
property?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. And until you can insure against those loans, what do you have to
receive from the United States department of Agriculture?
A. One of two things: Either a release or an agreement from a person who
would be buying the place that would agree to assume those obligations.
Q. Do you know if these are loans that have to be paid back?
12

A. The loans are typically ones that do not have to be repaid, providing the
borrower maintains the property and irrigation equipment and so on in
operating condition for a given period of time. At that point, then the debt
is normally extinguished.
Q. Do you know what that given period of time is?
A. No, I don't.
Q. And, here again, it may be very easy to go to the department of
agriculture and get releases, or it may be very difficult depending on their
inspection of the property; is that correct?
A. Yes. That's the determination that the ASCS has to make. And that's
it.
Lien #7 page 17 line 10
Q. Are there other liens?
A. Yes. Item 19.
Q. What is that?
A. Same thing that we have been talking about. Same type of an
obligation, but it's what we call a wild trust deed mortgage or lien
agreement in this case.
Q. And so I would ask what you mean by the word "Wild"?
A. It's a loan that was made to Nelson Farms through the ASCS office.
And at the time the loan was made, Nelson Farms did not have a
recorded interest in the property nor have they since acquired any.

In view of these encumbrances, which include a break in the chain of title, a mortgage,
real estate contract interests, and government loans, it was impossible for Joe Shields to
determine an amount that could and should be tendered to Mr. Harris as the purchase price.
Accordingly, Mr. Shields did the next best and most proper thing. He employed legal counsel
and Sunrise Title Company to perform a closing. Mr. Harris refused the contract price. He
arbitrarily demanded more. So the case went to trial.
But even after the completion of all the evidence at trial it was impossible to determine
what amount should be tendered to Mr. Harris because of the seven liens. Accordingly, the trial
13

court entered Findings of Fact paragraph 21 and Conclusions of Law paragraphs 5 and 6, which
require offsets to the sale price at such time as the cost of removing the liens and encumbrances
do in fact become known. These paragraphs are repeated here for quick reference:
21. There exists some liens and encumbrances on the title to the leased property which
will be removed at the expense of Harris or in the alternative, deducted from the purchase
price at the time of closing.

5. Harris must furnish Shields marketable title to the property at the date of closing.
6. The purchase price to be paid by Shields at closing is the price of $202,125.00 less all
credits andJiens. (emphasis added).

All of the arguments and the law cited above (which need not be repeated) respecting
why tender of payment should be excused, apply equally again because the title of the real
property to be sold in this case was encumbered. Until those encumbrances are resolved, it was
and still is impossible to determine a set amount to tender.

(C)
MR. HARRIS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE LEGITIMATE OFFSETS OWING TO MR.
SHIELDS THAT REDUCED THE CONTRACT PRICE.
The trial Court found that the Option To Buy contract was an incentive to induce Shields
to lease the property: "The 'Option To Buy' granted by Harris to Shields constituted an
incentive or a "dangling carrot" to induce Shields to enter into the ten year May 1, 1987, lease
with Harris. Shields relied upon the Option To Buy when entering the ten year lease." (Findings
of Fact, Appellant's Add., Doc. 4 at 3, ^ 9).
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Paragraph B of the Option To Buy contract provided that $5,000.00 of each year's lease
payment would be credited to the sale price. Mr. Shields was entitled to a seven year credit, or
$35,000.00 reduction off the sale price. Mr. Harris refused to recognize the Option To Buy with
this stated credit. He considered it "null and void" and "just a letter." (Tr. at 164 line 15). The
requirement for the tender of a purchase price must be excused when one party refuses to
recognize the enforceability of lawful credits applicable to the sale price under the contract.
On the basis of any one of the four reasons outlined in POINT 1 of this brief, and
summarized as follows, the appellants argument on appeal is without merit:
1. The appellant failed to cooperate in following the formula for setting the contract price;
2. The appellant announced that he would not accept a sum less than what he insisted
upon, regardless of any contract price;
3. The property to be sold was encumbered with liens and a set price was indeterminable;
4. The appellant refused to recognize legitimate offsets owing to appellee.

15

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY AND WAS CORRECT IN
A) HARMONIZING THE TERMS OF THE OPTION TO BUY CONTRACT
AND THE CORRESPONDING LEASE AGREEMENT; AND
B) THIS ISSUE IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF REVIEW ON APPEAL BECAUSE
IT WAS NEVER RAISED AT TRIAL.

A)
HARMONIZING THE TERMS OF THE OPTION TO BUY CONTRACT AND THE
CORRESPONDING LEASE AGREEMENT.
Two fundamental and undisputed facts lay the foundation for responding to the
appellant's second issue on appeal. First, Mr. Harris was a sophisticated Salt Lake City
businessman with twenty (20) years of experience in dealing with contracts. The following
portion of the testimony of Mr. Harris evidences his level of sophistication:
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) Mr. Harris, I understand that you are now retired?
A. Right.
Q. What was your occupation prior to being retired?
A. I was a nursing home operator
Q. How many nursing homes did you own and operate?
A. five.
Q. For how long did you do that?
A. 20 Years. 22 Years.
Q. In the business of owning and operating nursing homes, did you frequently enter into
agreements?
A. Into and agreement such as what, real estate?
Q. Did you have an occasion to negotiate contracts?
A. I had a negotiated contract with every one of the nursing homes that I bought or run.
Q. For 22 years you did that, didn't you?
A. That's right.
(Tr. at 154 line 19).
On the other hand, Mr. Shields, although an expert in cattle ranching, had a high school
education and left most of the paper work up to his wife who died shortly prior to legal action
commencing in this case. (Tr. at 97 line 10).
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The second critical fact is that Mr. Harris, with his background and expertise in
negotiating contracts, was the one who drafted the Option To Buy agreement. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Appellant's Add., Doc. 4 at 4, ^ 13). Mr. Shields relied implicitly upon
the Option To Buy contract and would have never entered into a long term, ten year lease,
without the Option To Buy. (Tr. at 108 line 19). Understanding that Mr. Harris was skilled in
contracts and that he prepared the contract in dispute in this case permits us to properly examine
appellant's second appeal point.
The courts are required to interpret provisions of an agreement so as to harmonize them
and give effect to all of an agreement's terms and provisions if possible. Hardline Co. Inc. v.
Eimco Corp, 266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954); Vance v. Arnold, 201 P.2d 475 (Utah 1949). In the
case of CLG.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989), this court, in reviewing
apparently conflicting provisions of an agreement, held:
In interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties intended by examining the entire
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and reasonable
construction to the contract as a whole. [Citation Omitted]. The Cardinal rule is to give
effect to the intention of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the
contract itself. [Citations Omitted]. Additionally, a contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of the terms and provisions and all of the terms should be given effect if
possible.
Id at 845.
Furthermore, this court has held that, "When agreements
are executed 'substantially contemporaneously and are clearly interrelated, they must be
construed as a whole and harmonized if possible.1" HCA Health Services of Utah v. St. Markfs
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Charities 846 P.2d 476,484 (Utah App. 1993). The trial court in the present case applied this
reasoning from HCA Health Services and found and entered Findings of Fact numbered one
through thirteen. Appellant's brief ignores Findings of Fact numbered one through twelve and
takes number thirteen out of context. But the trial court findings viewed together evidence that
the four written contracts between Harris and Shields were "clearly interrelated." Those four
contracts, all relating to the same real property, are; (1) the April 1, 1985 five year lease; (2) the
February 9, 1987 termination of the five year lease, (3) the February 10, 1987 Option To Buy
agreement; and, (4) the May 1, 1987 ten year lease.
Appellant argues that the trial court supplied a term inconsistent with the Option To Buy
agreement. This argument can be made only if one views the Option To Buy agreement as
standing all alone, with no relation to the other three written contracts. But the four contracts are
inseparable and the trial court's Findings of Fact, supported by Mr. Harris's own testimony,
affirm their connection. (See Findings of Fact, Appellant's Add., Doc. 4,ffl[1-13).
The so called "inconsistent term" alleged by appellant is that the Option To Buy
agreement refers to a seven year lease when in fact at the time of the execution of the Option To
Buy agreement there was no seven year lease. It is true that there was never a "seven" year lease,
(with emphasis being placed on the numerical number seven). In fact at the time that the Option
To Buy agreement was executed by Harris, there was not any lease in existence between the
parties. The five year lease had been expressly and mutually terminated one day earlier. The
Option To Buy was then given as a "dangling carrot" by Harris to induce Shields to enter into a
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longer term lease:
Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) There is no question in your mind, is there, Mr. Harris, that the
5,000 per year payment towards the purchase price was an inducement to get Mr. Shields
to buy, right?
A. (Mr. Harris) Yes. That's right. (Tr. at 159 line 6).
So Harris expected or hoped, that immediately upon giving the Option To Buy
agreement, Shields would come back and execute a new and longer term lease. When drafting
the Option To Buy agreement, Mr. Harris knew that no set term of years for a lease was in place
and therefore he referred by way of "example," to a seven year lease. Mr. Harris admits
that his reference to seven years was a number that he "just picked out of the air," and was only
to serve as "an example" in how he would give Shields credit. (Tr. at 159 line 19).
Shields did come back, on May 1, 1987, with a ten year lease. The "dangling carrot" by
Harris was effective in getting Shields to sign a new and long term contract with Harris. The ten
year period in the new lease was perfectly acceptable to Harris by his own admission at trial.
When asked why Mr. Harris terminated the five year lease, he responded, "Because Mr. Shields
wanted something more. He wanted a ten-year lease, and that was okay with me." (Tr. at 156 line
7).
For the next seven years Mr. Shields farmed the land and paid Mr. Harris the lease
payments, on time. But when another third party potential purchaser came along and made Mr.
Harris an offer to buy the land, Mr. Harris changed his tune and wanted to get out of the contract
with Shields:
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Q. (By Mr. Nebeker) So isn't it true, Mr. Harris, that another buyer came along with a
very favorable offer, and you wanted to do anything possible to make that offer valid and
accept it; isn't that right?
A. (By Mr. Harris) Yes, that's right.
Q. Okay. Now, did Mr. Shields make his annual lease payments?
A. Yes, he has.
(Tr. at 169 line 7).
The provisions of the Option To Buy agreement are reasonably interpreted and easily
understood when read in light of the pre-existing lease, the termination contract on that preexisting lease, and the forth coming ten year lease. To construe the Option To Buy contract in the
manner suggested by Harris is to work a harsh and cruel injustice on Shields. From the time of
receiving the ten year lease, Shields built his life around the option that he had to buy the land.
He improved the land consistently. He increased his cattle ranching operations according to his
improvements. Mr. Harris asks this court to throw out seven years of hard labor and expense
performed by Shields because, in essence, Mr. Harris got offered a better deal and on it's surface,
the option refers to a seven year lease when Mr. Harris granted Mr. Shields a ten year lease. The
trial court's interpretation of the option gives effect to all terms of the agreement and is in
harmony with both the previous agreements and the subsequent ten year lease.
Appellant has also argued that the Option to Buy does not specifically refer to when the
option must be exercised. Again, this argument is very specious. Paragraph "A" states that
"Lessee, Joseph W. Shields would have this Special option to buy said ranch from Lessor Arvil
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A. Harris ..." (Appellant's Add., Doc. 1.) The option was given to Shields as the "lessee." As long
as Shields is the lessee, he retains the option. Accordingly, the trial court gave Shields the right
to purchase the land at any time during the lease, while Shields was the lessee. To this day
Shields remains the lessee and Shields has already exercised that option and is patiently waiting
for this court to uphold the ruling of the trial court so that he may obtain title and pay Harris.
The language of the Option To Buy agreement is not inconsistent. But even if one reads it
so, any uncertainty must be construed against the party who drafted it. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated, "The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction
of a contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement." Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 at 1107 (Utah 1982). See also Hoffinan v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America 669 P.2d 410 at 417 (Utah 1983).
The trial court is given considerable latitude in its rulings as to specific performance and
the trial court in this instance should be afforded such latitude. The Utah Supreme Court has
found that:
Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense of justice and
good conscience of the court and accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is
allowed in [the trial court's] determination as to whether it shall be granted and what
judgment should be entered....
Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 976, 979 (Utah App. 1989), Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah
1981). See also LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961 (Utah 1988).
The trial court in this case should be afforded that latitude of discretion. Similarly the
Carr court, has stated that:
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[sjpecific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to the sense of justice
and good conscience of the court and accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is
allowed in determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment should be
entered in respect thereto; and ruling thereon should not be upset on appeal unless it
clearly appears that he has abused his discretion....
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court in Ferris v. Jennings,
595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979), has similarly found that since "...specific performance is an
equitable remedy, the trial judge has considerable discretion in determining whether equity and
good conscience require that the relief be granted." The trial court has not abused it's discretion
in this case, but properly gave Shields an Order and Decree for specific performance. That ruling
should be upheld.
B.
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RAISE NEW ISSUES ON
APPEAL.
Finally, the Appellant should not be permitted to raise new issues on appeal. The issues
raised in Point II of appellant's brief are raised for the first time on appeal. These are issues
which appellant failed to put before the court at trial. There is no argument in the record as to
when the option had to be exercised. There is no argument in the record that some lease other
than the ten year lease related to the option. There was no need for the court to clarify which
lease it was referring, because only one lease existed, the ten (10) year lease. Harris never
attempted to offer evidence at trial that there was only a seven year option on the ten year lease.
Therefore, Harris should be barred from raising such issues now.
Raising new factual issues on appeal, not addressed at the trial court, is a point that is
well grounded in case law and has been ruled on by this court and the Supreme Court of Utah on
22

many occasions. The Supreme Court in Rocky Mt. Thrift v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848,
850 (Utah 1994) states that "...issues were not raised before the trial court and may not now be
raised." Sse Slate y^Smith, 866 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1993); FranklinFin. v. New EmpireJleY.
CQ., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). The Supreme Court again addresses this issue in Stewart
y^JUtah Public Sendc^rommission, 885 P.2d759, 781 (Utah 1994). "The general rule is that an
issue may not be presented to an appellate court that was not first presented to a lower tribunal."
Id.. Shields respectfully requests that Point II of the Harris brief be stricken.

For the reasons set forth above, the ruling of the trial court should be upheld. The
Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance, with the Order On Supplemental Findings, issued
by the trial court should be affirmed. Appellant should pay all costs of the appeal.

ejreker, McConkie^ Wrijght

kim^

Richard K. Nebeker
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright

^

J W 6 >^W
Stacey G. Scnmidt
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Certificate DfHandJQeliyery
I hereby certify that on the vP day of May, 1996,1 caused to be hand delivered, a
and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee, to Appellants counsel as follows:
James L. Christensen
Corbridge Baird & Christensen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705
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ADDENDUM
1. Letter from Harris to Shields, dated November 5th, 1993.
2. Letter from Harris to Shields' attorney, dated November 12th, 1993.
3. Title Report by Stewart Title.
4. Letter from Shield's attorney to Harris dated August 2, 1993.
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COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE
ISSUED BY

S+mauy • / £<Mur«i<

S T EWART TITLE
GUARANTY

COMPANY

STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, A Texas Corporation, herein called the Company,
for a valuable consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as
identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee
of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and to
the Conditions and Stipulations hereof.
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the
amount of the policy or policies committed for have beer) inserted in Schedule A hereof by the
Company, either at the time of the issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement.
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all
liability and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six months after the effective date hereof
or when the policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the
failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fault of the Company.
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Commitment shall not be valid or binding until it
bears an authorized Countersignature.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Stewart Title Guaranty Company has caused its corporate name and
seal to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers on the date shown in Schedule A.

STEWART TITLE
GUARANTY

COMPANY

Chairman of the Board /

Authorized Sigr^icry

Company
City, State

SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY
193 NORTH STATE STREET 73-13
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
(801) 722-2257

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
SCHEDULE - A

1.

Effective Date September 15, 1993 @ 8:00 A.M.

2.

Policy or policies to be issued:
(A)
ALTA Owner's Policy- -Proposed Insured:
Joseph W. Shields.

Amount
STBD

Premium
STBD

(B)

STBD

STBD

ALTA Loan Policy—Proposed Insured:
Western Farm Credit Bank.

Endorsements:
Additional Charges (if any):

S

Multiple Sections

TOTAL PREMIUM

S300.00

STBD

The estate or interest in the" land described or referred to in this commitment and covered
herein is fee simple in and to the surface rights only and title thereto is at the effective date
hereof vested in:
AA & M, L.C., A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY.

(PARCELS 7, 8 & 9)

The land referred to in this commitment is described as follows:
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DUCHESNE.
TOWNSHIP 8 SOUTH, RANGE 17 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN.
SECTION 21: Southeast Quarter.
(Parcel 7)
SECTION 27: West Half Northwest Quarter.

(Parcel 8)

SECTION 28: North Half Northeast Quarter.

(Parcel 9)

S T E W A R T TITLE
GUARANTY COMPANY

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 2

SCHEDULE B - Section 1
Requirements

The following are the requirements to be complied with:
A.

Payment to Sunrise Title Company for the premiums, fees and charges for the policy.
Note:

In the event the transaction for which this commitment is furnished does not close
within thirty (30) days, the minimum fee due and payable is $300.00.

B.

Release(s) or reconveyance(s) of Exception(s) numbered 14 through 21.

C.

Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the
estate or interest to be insured.

D.

Proper instrument(s) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and duly
filed for record.

E.

Payment of all taxes, charges or assessments levied and assessed against said property which
are due and payable.

F.

Notify Sunrise Title Company in writing, the name of anyone not referred to herein who will
obtain an interest in and/or who will make a loan on the property. Sunrise Title Company
may then make additional requirements or exceptions.

G.

Any escrow closed by Sunrise Title Company involving the purchase of property, requires an
Owners Title Policy or, in the alternative, a Waiver of Insurance and Hold Harmless
Agreement signed by the purchaser.

H.

Borrower's Affidavit as to Debts and Liens.

S T E W A R T TITLE
GUARANTY

COMPANY

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 3
SCHEDULE B - Section 2
Exceptions

The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are
disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company:
1.

Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records.

2.

Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.

3.

Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts
which a correct survey and inspection of the premises would disclose and which are not shown
by the public records.

4.

Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material heretofore and hereafter furnished,
imposed by law and not shown by the public records.

5.

Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the
issuance thereof.

6.

Mineral rights, water rights, claims and/or title to said minerals or water.

7.

Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing
authority that levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records.

8.

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing
in the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date
the proposed insured acquires of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon
covered by this Commitment.

NOTE: EXCEPTION EIGHT WILL NOT APPEAR IN ANY POLICY TO BE ISSUED
HEREUNDER.
9.

This property is within the boundaries of Central Utah Water Conservancy District and
Johnson Water District and is subject to all charges and/or assessments levied thereby. Said
charges are assessed through the general county tax levy and may be subject to rollback
and/or reassessment. The total general county assessment for 1992 was $527.51, $152.75 and
S258.48, Reference Serial Number 4878, 4886, and 4887.
According to the official records of Duchesne County, all of said assessments have been paid
current through 1992. Taxes for 1993 are a lien but not yet due and payable.

10.

Assessment and taxation under the 1969 Farmland Assessment Act (Greenbelt) together with
any roll-back provision provided there under.
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9

S T E W A R T TITLE

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 4

11.

County road along North line of subject property.
Affects: Parcel 7

C\
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12.

Any right, title or interest of the estate of Randall Felter.

13.

An easement for the purpose shown below and rights incidental thereto as set forth in a
document
Granted to: Myton Water Association
(No representation is made as to the present ownershio of said easement)
Purpose: Right-of-ways
Recorded: April 29, 1971
Book: A-16
Page: 110-117
Entry Number 156696 through 156699
Affects: Parcel 7

14.

A mortgage to secure an indebtedness as shown below, and any other obligations secured
thereby
Amount: $32,100.00
Dated: May 27, 1976
Mortgagor James M. Rice and Carol L. Rice
Mortgagee: Farmers Home Administration
Recorded: June 18, 1976
Book: A-49
Page: 257-260
Entry Number: 189619
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

15.

An unrecorded Real Estate Contract between the following parties:
Dated: April 8, 1976
Seller: Arvil A. Harris and Mary S. Harris
Buyer Richtron Inc., a Utah Corporation
The above described Real Estate Contract is referenced and affected by the following
described documents:
Notification of Contract
Recorded: April 17, 1978
Book: A-60
Page: 505-506
Entry Number: 197388
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9
Assignment of Contract
Dated: March 14, 1980
Assignor. Richtron, Inc.
Assignee: Utah Farm Production Credit Association
Recorded: April 1, 1980
Book: A-73 Page: 14-22
Entry Number 207484
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9

S T E W A R T TITLE

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT. BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 5
Notification of Sale of Interest and Assignment
Dated: July 31, 1981
Assignor Richtron, Inc.
Assignee: Frontier Investments, a Utah Corp.
Recorded: October 29-, 1982
Book: A-95 Page: 398-399
Entry Number: 227205
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9
Quit-Claim Deed
Dated: June 10, 1982
Grantor: Richtron, Inc.
Grantee: Frontier Investments, a Utah Corp.
Recorded: October 29, 1982
Book: A-95 Page: 400
Entry Number: 227206
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9
Notice of Rights and Interests in Real Property and Improvements
Dated: August 1, 1984
Buyer Frontier Investments, as assignee of Richtron, Inc.
Seller Arvil A. Harris and Mary S. Harris
Recorded: August 6, 1984
Book: A-116 Page: 784-785
Entry Number: 240648
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9

16.

An unrecorded Real Estate Contract between the following parties
Dated: December 19, 1978
Seller: Virginia Felter, Marion Felter and Elizabeth Felter
Buyer Richtron, Inc., a Utah Corporation
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9
The above described Real Estate Contract is referenced and affected by the following
described documents:
Assignment of Contract
Dated: March 14, 1980
Assignor: Richtron, Inc.
Assignee: Utah Farm Production Credit Association
Recorded: April 1, 1980
Book: A-73 Page: 6-13
Entry Number: 207483

STEWART TITLE

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT B A N K / S H I E L D S
PAGE NUMBER 6
Notification of Sale of Interest and Assignment
Dated: July 31, 1981
Assignor Richtron, Inc.
Assignee: Frontier Investments, a Utah Corp.
Recorded: October 29, 1982
Book: A-95
Page: 398-399
Entry N u m b e r 227205
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9
Quit-Claim Deed
Dated: June 10, 1982
Grantor: Richtron, Inc.
Grantee: Frontier Investments, a Utah Corp.
Recorded: October 29, 1982
Book: A-95 Page: 400
Entry Number: 227206
Affects: Parcels 7, 8, and 9
Notice of Rights and Interest in Real Property and Improvements
Dated: August 1, 1984
Buyer: Frontier Investments, as assignee of Richtron, Inc.
Seller: Virginia Felter, Marion Felter and Elizabeth Feiter
Recorded: August 6, 1984
Book: A-116
Page: 786-787
Entry Number: 240649
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

17.

Agreement and Lien
Amount: S35,000.00
Dated: May 9, 1983
Debtor: Arvil A. Harris
Creditor: U.S.A., acting through the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service,
United States Department of Agriculture
Recorded: September 28, 1983
Book: A-106
Page: 35-36
Entry Number: 233906
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

18.

Agreement and Lien
Amount: 531,550.00
Dated: March 5, 1986
Debtor: Arvil A. Harris
Creditor: U.S.A., acting through the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service,
United States Department of Agriculture
Recorded: November 17, 1986 ^
Book: A-153 Page: 164-165'
Entry Number: 257381
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

STEWART TITLE

RE:

COMMITMENT
PILE NUMBER TO^yibA
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 7

19.

Any interest of Nelson Farms, as disclosed by their execution of the Agreement and Lien
referenced below. At the date of said Agreement and Lien, said mortgagors had no record
interest in said land, nor have they since acquired any.
Amount: 534,184.00
Dated: September 10, 1985
Mortgagor Nelson Farms
Mortgagee: U.S.A., acting through the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service,
United States Department of Agriculture
Recorded: September 30, 1985
Book: A-134 Page: 597-598
Entry Number: 249129
Affects: Parcel 8

20.

Notice of Interest
Dated: April 19, 1993
Lesson Arvil A. Harris
Le^e.^*. Ios^ph W. Shields
Recorded: April 19, 1993
Book: A-224 Page: 280
Entry Number. 293553
Said Notice of Interest references a lease dated May 1, 1987.
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

21.

Option to Purchase
Dated: February 10, 1987
Seller: Arvil A. Harris
Buyer: Joseph W. Shields
Recorded: April 20,1993
Book: A-224 Page: 343-344
Entry Number: 293579
Affects: Parcels 7, 8 and 9

STEWART TITLE
fifiiffivTY

rnup^NY

RE:

COMMITMENT
FILE NUMBER R93326A
WESTERN FARM CREDIT BANK/SHIELDS
PAGE NUMBER 8
SCHEDULE B - Section 3
Abstracter Notes
Any matter in dispute between you and the Company may be subject to arbitration as an
alternative to court action pursuant to the Title Insurance Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, a copy of which is available on request from the Company. Any decision reached
by arbitration shall be binding upon both you and the Company. The arbitration award may
include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may be entered as a judgment in any court
of proper jurisdiction.

2.

Names checked and cleared for liens and judgments of record, except as noted herein, are as
follows:
AA & M, L.C.
Joseph W. Shields
Arvil A. Harris
Mary S. Harris
Randall Felter
Marion Felter
Virginia S. Felter

SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY
193 North State Street (73-13)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(801)722-2257

STEWART TITLE
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COMPANY
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August 2, 199 3
Frederick N. Green
GREEN & BERRY
10 Exchange Place #622
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Green,
I represent Joe Shields with respect to a Lease Agreement and Option
To Purchase on property titled in the name of your client, Arvil Harris.
Mr. Shields was previously represented by the law firm of Callister,
Duncan & Nebeker. However, it has been brought to the attention of
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker that Mr. Harris currently does his estate
planning through Lee McCullough, an attorney with Callister, Duncan &
Nebeker. Because of this conflict of interest, I will be handling the
case from here on.
I have reviewed the Lease Agreement and Option To Purchase and believe
them to be binding contracts, legally entered by the parties for good
and valuable consideration and without fraud, ^duress, or illegality.
Please be on notice that Mr. Shields intends t^ exercise his option to
purchase the subject property pursuant to the option to buy contract.
Mr. Shields has now obtained four of the five required appraisals of
the subject property.
The remaining appraisal, through the Soil
Conservation Service in Roosevelt, presents a problem.
The Soil
Conservation Service has refused to so conduct an appraisal, indicating
that they are not qualified. Accordingly, we must agree to either waive
the Soil Conservation appraisal, or agree on who the fifth appraiser
should be to take their place. Mr. Shields is agreeable to waiving the
fifth appraiser and is willing to offer $500 towards the purchase price,
in lieu of paying another appraisal fee. Please let me know how your
client desires to proceed in this regard.
Jj£ This correspondence is intended to give you notice that Mr. Shields
'is now ready, willing, and able to exercise his option to purchase the
property by paying Mr. Harris the purchase price. We expect to receive
good and marketable title to the subject property free and clear of all
encumbrances.
Please provide evidence that Mr. Harris now has
marketable title to the subject property, free and clear of any and all
liens and encumbrances. At your convenience, we would like to schedule
a closing date with a local title company in Duchesne. I look forward
to your response.

